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Usually when we talk about the significance of  linking philosophy and 
education together we tend to defend the practical uses of  philosophy in education. An 
education inflected by philosophy is often thought to be beneficial for reproducing our 
democracy. Martha Nussbaum’s work has been exemplary in drawing out this point.1 
Against the prevailing general suspicion, if  not outright dismissal, of  philosophy’s ability 
of  ever being able to engage or do anything useful in the real world, Nussbaum has 
eloquently and consistently defended the practical role that philosophy needs to play in 
an education vested with reproducing democratic citizens. For Nussbaum, cultivating 
the capacities for thinking and imagining, and for making philosophical arguments, 
crucially contributes to fostering our capabilities for self-reflection, empathy, dialogue 
and reason. These are all qualities that need to be nurtured in a democracy so that 
those likely to be affected by a decision can gather to discuss, to give shape, and possibly 
encounter and learn from other opinions. Accordingly, our ability to deliberate as 
socially uninhibited and equal citizens is greatly facilitated by an education that makes 
use of  philosophy to allow us to encounter how our own positions are not uniquely 
reasonable and need further elaboration and justification. Facing contrasting ideas and 
having to rationally justify and test our own claims and intuitions alongside others – a 
basic premise of  philosophy – consequently nurtures in us a way of  living with others 
in mutual (rational) respect. All this helps us to consciously commit and reproduce the 
project of  sustaining an ever-growing plurality.   
There is thus, for Nussbaum, a clear, practical, educational role that philosophy 
must play in a democracy. There would be dire social consequences, according to her, 
if  we were to elide the usefulness of  philosophy for education – deliberative democracy 
would itself  be at stake. 
Like many people working in education and committed to democracy, I am 
sympathetic to Nussbaum’s arguments. Admittedly, I often rehearse a version of  her 
argument to my undergraduate students who sometimes lose patience or want to 
know ‘what’s the use of  philosophy in education anyways.’ Indeed, given the pervasive 
and menacing manner in which the managerial logic of  efficiency is undermining 
the place of  the humanities in education, I appreciate her strategic defense for the 
role of  philosophy in education. But, as Theodore Adorno once remarked: to defend 
something means to give something up in what one is defending. So, while generally 
supportive of  Nussbaum’s claims, I think it is important to shift the emphasis and ask, 
what are we giving up when we make (as Nussbaum does) a practical defense for the 
usefulness of  philosophy in reproducing democratic citizens? What in this defense of  
philosophy and education are we giving up in philosophy and education? Well, for 
1 Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of  Reform in Liberal 
Education (Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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one, I want to propose we might be giving up, or, perhaps not accentuating enough, 
something crucially significant about philosophy and education, which has to do with 
its uselessness and resistance to practicality.   
Rather than hurrying to defend philosophy’s use and purpose in producing 
better citizens, what would it mean to think about the relationship between philosophy 
and education by considering the significance of  the impracticality of  philosophy? 
What happens to our thinking about the relationship between philosophy and 
education when we affirm uselessness? 
There is something about philosophy that seems to escape us and tenaciously 
resists being likened with use or applicability. Even our tendency to proclaim value to 
what is useful would be something that philosophy would ask us to unsettle. Philosophy 
gets going when our self-assurances become unsettled and the self-evident returns 
as a question. Philosophy seems to be more like a pause, an unsettling question or 
interruption that vexes, rather than something that can be practically measured, 
captured or instantly applied. The very frustrations we might have with the pause 
and inaction that philosophy offers might actually help us put into relief  and expose 
a prevalent and often unexamined impulse in our time: our drive to find practical 
solutions and answers rather than dwelling with questions. We get frustrated with 
questions that beget further questions because we live in a culture where everything 
is apparently in “crisis,” where the “emergencies” upon us do not allow us to waste 
time, where we need to find relevant and purposeful applicable results at once. 
Admittedly, the consequence of  living in a constant state of  emergency means that 
we become ever more prone to oversimplifications and thoughtlessness as we have 
no time to dwell without answers. This culture of  emergency-response seems to be 
particularly pervasive, I think, in schools and in the teaching profession, which always 
feels compelled to find immediate novel responses to manage the latest crisis.  
While those arguing from Nussbaum’s position might propose fostering 
“deliberative practices” in schools to counter our susceptibility to thoughtlessness, I 
think such practices in the end translate into a form of  “critical thinking.” That is, a 
set of  skills for decoding logical inferences, which is another purposeful application to 
secure results. This task-oriented practice vastly differs from the sense of  philosophy that 
I’m gesturing to. By not being afraid to affirm the impracticality implicit in the coupling 
of  philosophy and education we admit a disposition for thinking that is completely 
different than “critical thinking.” What this disposition offers is meaningful to consider. 
Ron Scapp reminds us that by announcing the impracticality of  philosophy rather than 
“sounding a cynical death knell to the significance of  philosophy… we actually assert 
its value, albeit a value not immediately or directly transposable to the practical affairs 
of  the ‘market.”2 According to Scapp, affirming philosophy’s impracticality proposes 
a reversal of  intentionality. We do not direct philosophy to this or that purpose but 
we are instead summoned and led by the time it takes to properly reflect and deeply 
2 Ron Scapp, “On the Practicality of  Practical Philosophy,” Studies in Practical 
Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2004): 71. 
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wonder about what might turn up through our thinking. In this juncture, a different 
time and disposition towards the world opens up. 
What I’m suggesting is that by bringing this sense of  philosophy to education 
we unleash the wondering function so that education can become something more 
than socialization. With wonder we learn to light up the world, which helps us guard 
against being thoughtless toward each other and the world.  
Dwelling with wonderment, and taking time for thinking, leads us to an older, 
perhaps forlorn, sense of  what it means to be in skholē (the etymological root of  school). 
Skholē proposes a very un-practical time and place. Eduardo Duarte, drawing on 
Hannah Arendt’s insight regarding the significance of  inhabiting the “modality of  the 
spectator” when we think, notes that skholē is where one can remain withdrawn from 
the pressing, hurried and frenzied events of  life, action and self-interest.3 And, as such, 
by being in skholē one is empowered by the privilege of  cultivating a perspective that 
enables one to see, understand and sense what the actor caught up in the action cannot 
perceive. Skholē is thus a time and place for igniting a thoughtfulness that, in the shelter 
of  its withdrawal, can dwell with questions in a rapt attentiveness and with a care that 
extends beyond immediate concerns. Actually, in order for philosophy to be possible, 
it demands the shelter that the impractical time and place of  skholē affords. Bringing 
education to philosophy gives philosophy a time and place to cultivate wonderment, 
and to think our thinking through in a way that is not possessed by purposes or by the 
need to jump into action. Here the link between philosophy and education concerns 
recalling and forging the sense of  skholē in school by apportioning a dwelling-place 
that can nourish and sustain the pathos of  wonderment. I don’t think the concern that 
mobilizes philosophy and education for the sake of  socialization gives enough attention 
to the significance of  recovering this sense of  skholē in school. Rather, many distrust 
this time and place of  withdrawal and are irritated by the attitude of  wonder that spurs 
ever more questions that make us less assured. 
Whereas we cannot teach the pathos of  wonderment in the same manner we 
teach a skill, we can conserve a time and place where the self-evidence of  our purposes 
and of  what we think we know can return to us as something strange. In this sense, 
education gives philosophy a time and place to do its thing, while philosophy can lead 
education to sense and wonder about the world with an attentiveness and care that, 
since it need not have any practical purpose or assurances, can always surprise us with 
the unexpected.
3 Eduardo Manuel Duarte, “Educational Thinking and the Conservation of  the 
Revolutionary,” Teachers College Record 112, no. 2 (2010): 500.
AntistAsis 15
Biograpy
Mario Di Paolantonio is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of  Education at York 
University. Drawing on ethical philosophy and innovative methodologies, his award 
winning research explores the contested and varying manner in which education and 
memorial sites attempt to come to terms with historical wrongs.  He is an International 
Research Associate with the Unit for Global Justice at Goldsmiths College, University 
of  London, and at the Centro de Estudios en Pedagogías Contemporáneas and the 
Escuela de Humanidades at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM), 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
Email: mdipaolantonio@edu.yorku.ca
